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Seventh Circuit Rules in favor of WARF in Licensing Dispute with Xenon Pharmaceuticals

Written by on Thursday, January 14th, 2010

The Seventh Circuit decided last week in favor of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”) in its licensing dispute with Xenon Pharmaceuticals.

As I stated in my Silicon Valley IP Licensing Blog posting on this case, I strongly agree with the outcome in this case and I view this decision as an affirmation of a licensor’s rights in an exclusive license of joint intellectual property.  Had the case been decided differently, I certainly would have had some practical concerns as an IP licensing attorney as to how exclusive licenses to joint intellectual property in collaborations should be drafted.

For another take on this case, you might want to check out PatentlyO, which did not really take a position on the outcome, but provided a little different commentary on the court’s decision.

While this case may not have any groundbreaking precedential value as an intellectual property decision, I think it provides some good practical lessons for anyone drafting or negotiating license and collaboration agreements in the biotech world, whether representing a corporation or working for a tech transfer office at a university, as well as for those who are actually executing the agreements once they are signed.  Clearly, some mistakes were made here that resulted in expensive litigation and will likely result in a costly damage award against Xenon as the loser.


Category: Biotech Deals, Biotech Disputes, Biotech Legal Disputes, Biotech Patent Licensing, Practical Tips, University Tech Transfer  |  Comments Off on Seventh Circuit Rules in favor of WARF in Licensing Dispute with Xenon Pharmaceuticals

Former City of Hope Inventor Files Suit to Collect Back Royalties

Written by on Thursday, August 21st, 2008

A former City of Hope inventor has filed suit against his former employer to collect back royalties on technology that was the subject of a recent verdict for City of Hope against Genentech.

Robert Crea, the inventor at issue, filed suit in Los Angeles superior court in early August, following the resolution of the City of Hope’s dispute with Genentech.  The California Biotech Law Blog previously posted on this verdict, which was reached in April, 2008.

The Silicon Valley/ San Jose Business Journal reported on Crea’s suit against City of Hope as follows:

Crea worked in 1977 and 1978 as the lead synthetic chemist at the City of Hope DNA Chemistry Laboratory before moving on to Genentech, according to the lawsuit. . . .Crea is seeking approximately 5 percent of the royalties that went to City of Hope related to technology developed there, according to his attorney, Robert Yorio, a partner at Carr & Ferrell LLP, who is representing Crea. The Southern California medical center is collecting close to $5 million in damages and interest as a result of the suit.

“The City of Hope policy is a 15 percent (royalty) that is paid to inventors,” Yorio said. “And that 15 percentage would be shared. We are asking for his share.”

This case will be interesting to follow as it moves forward, given the fact that the suit seems to be based on the alleged failure by the City of Hope to fairly implement a royalty policy as opposed a breach of an existing written contract with the individual inventor.   I have not yet tracked down a copy of the complaint, but would be interested review the exact nature of the plaintiff’s allegations against City of Hope.

This case may very well serve as a warning for other institutions with similar royalty payment policies in place for their employees: perhaps such institutions need to take another look as to how these policies are dealt with upon an employee’s departure from the institution.  I doubt very many employers expect their former employees to sue them on such grounds after they have left the company for a new position elsewhere, but perhaps in today’s world where large verdicts on IP matters are commonplace,  they should be giving this issue further consideration.


Category: Biotech Disputes, Biotech Legal Disputes, Biotech Patent Licensing  |  Comments Off on Former City of Hope Inventor Files Suit to Collect Back Royalties

California Supreme Court Overturns Punitive Damage Award Against Genentech

Written by on Thursday, April 24th, 2008

The California Supreme Court has overturned a $200 million punitive damage award against Genentech in the City of Hope National Medical Center case.  A copy of the opinion is attached.

The San Francisco Business Times reported on the ruling as follows:

Because of the court’s decision, Genentech (NYSE: DNA) will still pay out about $475 million in the second quarter of 2008, which includes $300 million in compensatory damages and interest since the original jury decision in 2002. . . . the removal of punitive damages will save Genentech about $315 million when interest is factored in.

The suit, filed in 1999, was over a 1976 research agreement in which Genentech paid royalties to the hospital. A first trial ended in a hung jury in October 2001. In a retrial verdict in 2002, South San Francisco-based Genentech was ordered to pay $300 million in royalties and $200 million in punitive damages.

The California court’s decision will likely be viewed with a sense of relief by the California business community, which was stunned by the 2005 damage award against Genentech for breach of contract..  It is highly unusual for punitive damages to be awarded in a breach of contract case, and of course, the concern was that this decision would set a new precedent.

Bloomberg.com reported on the history of the dispute between the parties:

The dispute between Genentech and City of Hope involves a research relationship more than 30 years ago. Doctors Arthur Riggs and Keiichi Itakura, who began working under contract with Genentech in 1976, produced human insulin two years later. The contract gave Genentech, then a fledgling company, the patents on the techniques used by Riggs and Itakura. In exchange, City of Hope was to receive a 2 percent royalty on sales of products that resulted from the patents. A dispute arose over the products covered by the contract.

City of Hope said it deserved royalties from 35 patent license agreements between Genentech and 22 other companies including Shering-Plough Corp. and American Home Products Corp. The center sued Genentech for breach of contract and fiduciary duty in 1999.

Genentech said in 2002 that it owed royalty payments to City of Hope only for sales of products made using DNA produced by the center and containing the patented technology from the sponsored research. The company said it paid City of Hope more than $300 million over 20 years.

A jury ruled against Genentech and awarded City of Hope compensatory damages and punitive damages. A state appeals court in Los Angeles upheld the jury’s verdict in 2004 and the California Supreme Court agreed to review the case in 2005.

What was the basis for today’s California Supreme Court ruling?  An excerpt from the opinion explains the Court’s decision as follows:

[W]e conclude that the trial court erred here in instructing the jury that a fiduciary relationship is necessarily created when a party, in return for royalties, entrusts a secret idea to another to develop, patent, and commercially develop.  Because fidicuary duties do not necessarily arise from this type of relationship, City of Hope’s only theory at trial for claiming a fiduciary relationship with Genentech was legally invalid, and therefore the judgment against Genentech is defective insofar as it is based on the jury’s finding that Genentech breached fiduciary duties owed to City of Hope. . . . .The only other ground for the jury’s imposition of liability against Genentech was the jury’s finding that Genentech had breached its contract with City of Hope.  Because punitive damages may not be awarded for breach of contract. . . .the award of punitive damages must be set aside.

The Recorder noted in an article that it ran last fall that the case between Genentech and City of Hope had been plagued by delays:

 Both parties [in the case] had fully briefed the case by December 2005, and 21 amicus curiae briefs had been filed and responded to by April 2006. Still, the court hasn’t set an oral argument date for City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech Inc., S129463.

Some court watchers are baffled by how long the case has languished. . . .Other than death penalty cases, which take years to process, only two out of 135 pending California Supreme Court cases — both criminal — have been awaiting oral argument longer than City of Hope.

Why were there so many delays in this case?  The Recorder offered some possible explanations:

Paul Utrecht, a partner in San Francisco’s Zacks Utrecht & Leadbetter who filed an amicus brief supporting Genentech for the Washington Legal Foundation, said the court’s justices could be proceeding cautiously because of the money involved. . . .Utrecht also said the legal issue — whether a breach of contract rises to despicable conduct that merits punitive damages — is so important that the court might be examining the case from all angles. . . . .It’s also possible the justices haven’t decided what to do with the case, and are still trading memos in the hopes that a tentative majority will emerge.

While Genentech cannot possibly be happy with the 2005 verdict and damage award, today’s ruling will at least take the some of the sting out of the verdict.  A $200 million reduction in damages is certainly not "chump change" and will surely help with the company’s bottom line. 

For the rest of us in California, today’s decision is similarly significant because it reaffirms that punitive damages cannot be awarded in contract cases–there must be a fiduciary relationship.  More importantly, for the biotech community (and even the high tech and medical device communities in California), we now have clarification from the California Supreme Court  that licensing relationships do not establish fiduciary relationships and therefore will not  incur punitive damages if they are breached.    


Category: Biotech Disputes, Biotech Legal Disputes, Biotech Patent Licensing  |  Comments Off on California Supreme Court Overturns Punitive Damage Award Against Genentech

CV Therapeutics Signs Lucrative Deal with TPG-Axon Capital

Written by on Thursday, April 17th, 2008

Palo Alto-based CV Therapeutics signed a lucrative deal earlier this week with New York-based TPG-Axon Capital in which TPG-Axon Capital, a New York hedge fund, agreed to pay up to $185 million in exchange for the payment of a royalty in the amount of fifty percent of its North American sales of Lexiscan, reported the San Jose Business Journal

According to the San Jose Business Journal, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration("FDA") recently approved CV Therapeutics’s Lexiscan injection, an A2A adenosine receptor agonist, for use as a pharmacologic stress agent for patients unable to undergo adequate exercise for stress tests.

The San Jose Business Journal reported on the terms of the deal as follows:

[T]he deal with. . . .TPG-Axon Capital includes $175 million on closing of the transaction and a potential future milestone payment of $10 million. . . .CV Therapeutics retains rights to the other 50 percent of royalty revenue from North American sales of the product [by its partner Astellas Pharma US, Inc., and also may receive a royalty on another Astellas product under the terms of the company’s collaboration agreement with Astellas Pharma US Inc.

The San Jose Mercury News further reported:

[I]nvestment bank Leerink Swann described the $175 million payment as "a surprisingly positive transaction," because other heart stressing agents already are on the market.

"The magnitude of this deal is much bigger than we would expect since physicians we have queried seem relatively uninterested in a novel cardiac stress agent," the report said.

It goes with out staying that a deal of this magnitude dramatically improves CV Therapeutics’ cash flow situation.  According the the San Jose Business Journal, CV Therapeutics plans to use the financing to meet a 2010 debt obligation and to also support its commercialization plans for Ranexa.

 

 


Category: Biotech Deals, Biotech Patent Licensing  |  Comments Off on CV Therapeutics Signs Lucrative Deal with TPG-Axon Capital

Cell Genesys Closes $320 Million Deal with Takeda

Written by on Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

While investors may not aways support biotech alliances as discussed in our  March 27th blog posting, entering into an alliance with a pharmaceutical company can still make good business sense, as in the case of the $320 million Cell Genesys-Takeda deal that closed this week. 

The In Vivo Blog reported on the terms of the deal as follows:

Takeda agreed to fork over $50 million in up-front payments, plus additional regulatory and commercialization milestones worth up to $270 million for exclusive world-wide rights to the product. In addition, Takeda will pay Cell Genesys tiered, double-digit royalties based on net sales of the GVAX immunotherapy in the US; in all other regions, Cell Genesys will receive flat double-digit royalties. Not quite a profit split, but again, by no means stingy.

Just as important, going forward Takeda will pay for all external development costs associated with the the immunotherapy’s clinical development and will also pick up the tab for all additional development and commercialization costs. Cell Genesys even managed to wrangle a co-promote option–US only–out of the Japanse firm. Finally, the deal only includes the prostate cancer immunotherapy. Cell Genesys is free to develop its GVAX technology to treat other cancers.

Why did this deal make good business sense for Cell Genesys? 

According to the In Vivo Blog, one reason is that Cell Genesys obtained a deal which will pay the company a significant amount of money in an agreement for technology that remains unproven–Cell Genesys Phase III GVAX immunotherapy for prostate cancer.

Moreover, the partnership will provide the cash to cover the costs that Cell Genesys anticipates burning this year,  The In Vivo Blog explains as follows:

On its fourth quarter earnings call in late February, the company’s CFO, Sharon Tetlow, reported it had just $147 million in cash. Not bad for a biotech, but not good considering the $100 to $105 million burn the company forecasted for 2008, thanks largely to the significant costs associated with its prostate cancer immunotherapy trials, VITAL-1 and VITAL-2. With one partnership, the company has managed to off-load the lion’s share of these costs, giving it some much needed breathing room, while still enjoying upsides in terms of development and generous royalties. 

All in all, the In Vivo Blog concludes that "[t]here’s no doubt the deal makes financial sense for Cell Genesys.  However, did this deal really make sense for Takeda?

First of all, backing the GVAX Prostate is highly risky, according toThe Street.com’s Adam Fuerstein, who argues that the clinical data to date is unreliable. 

Second of all, the controversy surrounding cancer immunotherapies may have been a red flag to other companies, who In Vivo Blog suggests would have "steered clear of Cell Genesys’s GVAX Prostate."

On the other hand, the In Vivo Blog suggests that the deal furthered Takeda’s recent growth strategy:

[Takeda] is desperate to extend its reach beyond Japan given that country’s sluggish growth and harsh price cuts. And, like other pharmas, Takeda certainly faces its own patent cliff. But the Japanese pharma is taking bold steps to play in the large molecule arena; according to Windhover’s Strategic Transactions Database, Takeda has signed 9 large molecule alliances since 2006. While most of the deals have focused on antibody technology–a la the Amgen partnership–the company is no stranger to risky ventures. Last summer, Takeda became one of the first pharmas to collaborate with aptamer pioneer, Archemix. . . .

So, perhaps this deal will really be a win-win for both parties.  Feurstein expresses his doubts and even the In Vivo Blog is not so sure.

Regardless of how Takeda fares, it is clear that Cell Genesys will benefit from this alliance–thus demonstrating in a very clear way why entering into alliances can be a good business decision for biotech companies.


Pfizer to Discontinue Sales of Inhaled Insulin Drug Exubera

Written by on Friday, October 19th, 2007

Pfizer announced on Thursday its decision to discontinue sales of its new inhaled insulin drug Exubera.

Exubera was developed by San Carlos-based Nektar Therapeutics, which licensed the drug to Pfizer.   According to the Philadelphia Business Journal, Pfizer plans to transfer the rights to Exubera back to Nektar Therapeutics and take a “$2.8 billion charge to dispose of its interests in it.”

The Philadelphia Business Journal reported:

Pfizer at one time said Exubera, approved about two years ago by the Food and Drug Administration, would be a $2 billion-a-year drug, but it was slow in rolling out the marketing of the drug and its device, which was criticized by doctors and insulin users as being too bulky.

So what happened to cause Pfizer to pull the plug on Exubera?

The San Jose Mercury News reported on the background to this decision as follows:

Because 21 million Americans have diabetes and many of them dislike injecting insulin, Exubera – the first-ever inhaled insulin system for adults – was widely expected to be a blockbuster. . . . But despite a recently launched TV ad blitz by Pfizer, the product has been a major disappointment. Although Pfizer has been vague about overall sales, the company revealed that Exubera’s revenue for the second quarter of this year was a mere $4 million. Some people attribute Exubera’s dismal sales to the fact that it is more expensive and complicated to use than injectable insulin. Figuring out the proper dose of Exubera also is somewhat different than with injectable insulin. And because Exubera can hinder lung function in some cases, anyone using it is supposed to get a lung test first. In addition, some doctors complain that a daily dose of Exubera costs at least twice as much as the injectable variety and that some insurance companies won’t pay for it.  But others fault Pfizer for not manufacturing it quickly enough, trying to market it initially with an ill-prepared sales team and delaying its ad campaign until this summer.

The Wall Street Journal Online reported on Pfizer’s decision as follows:

Drug companies often cancel drugs during human trials, and occasionally after they go on the market if there are any red flags about safety. But to pull a new drug from the market because it didn’t sell — in the absence of a red flag — is almost unprecedented.

“This is one of the most stunning failures in the history of the pharmaceutical industry,” said Mike Krensavage, an analyst at Raymond James & Associates. “I hope it would give Pfizer pause about buying any more assets.”

Pharma Marketing Blog took the analysis of Pfizer’s decision one step further and compared the failure of Exubera to the sinking of the Titantic:

There are plenty of . . . similarities between Exubera’s failure and the failure of the “unsinkable” Titanic. I am specifically talking about Pfizer’s hubris and marketing’s poisoned Kool Aid. Like the builders of the Titanic, the Exubera marketers felt they had an “unsinkable” product that would quickly reach blockbuster status and make the company a bundle.

It is unclear to date as to the exact terms and conditions of the Nektar Therapeutics license agreement, but the Wall Street Journal Online described Pfizer’s action as a “termination” of the license agreement for a definitive price, and The Mercury News reported that Nektar Therapeutics will have the ability to sell and market the Exubera itself on an ongoing basis.  Thus, there is reason to believe that Pfizer’s decision constituted the termination of an exclusive licensing agreement, and that the parties had previously agreed in writing to the specific damage amount to be paid to Nektar Therapeutics in the event of termination.

Apparently, however, Nektar Therapeutics is still recovering from the shock it received yesterday with Pfizer’s announcement, and has yet to announce its future plans for the drug.  The Wall Street Journal Online reported:

The news that Pfizer was abandoning Exubera came as a surprise to Nektar of San Carlos, Calif., from which Pfizer licensed Exubera. Nektar issued a scathing news release late yesterday accusing its partner of a poor marketing job and of not alerting Nektar it would be terminating their licensing deal. Pfizer says it told Nektar of its plans minutes after releasing the news, because the announcement was material for both companies.

The Wall Street Journal Online points out that, even if Nektar Therapeutics does try to move forward with the commercialization of Exubera, questions remain as to the safety and overall viability of inhaled insulin products:

[T]he market for other inhaled-insulin products still in development [is up in the air]. Part of Exubera’s problem — the safety concerns that come with inhaling a drug — will be hard to surmount for any product that goes into the lungs, in the absence of long-term data. There is also the question of whether patients want to inhale insulin, or are really resistant to needles.  In the 11 years since Pfizer bought into the idea, insulin pens have made injecting the drug less painful than the traditional needle and syringe.

The Exubera debacle shines a spotlight on the role of the medical community in determining whether a novel technology is a success or a failure.  While there is no doubt that a variety of factors contributed to the product’s failure, clearly Pfizer did not focus adequately on addressing the concerns of the medical community in its attempt to bring Exubera to market.  Too many lingering questions about the product and its delivery system remain, and my suspicion is that the conservative medical community urged patients to stick with the tried and true products rather than to give Exubera a try.  In all likelihood, the fact that the product was more expensive than the other options on the market was just the icing on the cake.


Stanford, UC Representatives Offer Insights on Licensing with their Universities

Written by on Friday, August 3rd, 2007

The Silicon Valley Chapter of Licensing Executives Society ("LES") recently sponsored an event in whch representatives from Stanford and the University of California ("UC") offered tips on licensing with the Stanford and UC systems.  Katharine Ku of Stanford University and Viviana Wolinsky of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory each gave an excellent presentation, outlining their respective university’s policies and procedures, as well as some of the issues of concern currently facing each organization.  Nader Mousavi of Wilmer Hale, which hosted the event, also participated.

What were some of the insights on their employers’ respective licensing programs that the two speakers shared?

Regarding the issue of exclusive licensing terms, Ku indicated that Stanford prefers fixed terms of exclusivity.  In contrast, Wolinsky indicated that UC is generally more willing than Stanford to agree to exclusive licenses that run for the full term of the patent.

On the issue of royalty rates, the speakers agreed that the range often runs from 3 to 6 % of net sales.  Wolinsky shared that the UC system is willing to consider royalty stacking, if this is brought up in the negotiations, and that UC may be willing to reduce the royalty rate on each license to half of what would otherwise be agreed to. 

On the issue of sublicensing, the speakers agreed that a royalty based on net sales from sublicensees is the current standard for UC and Stanford license agreements, replacing the once-common standard of a royalty based on sublicense income (which, in all honesty, I have never seen used in the licensing negotations I have been involved with).  The panel advised that in cases where sublicense income is used as the standard for the sublicensing royalty rate that the following should be excluded: research and development payments, equity, patent reimbursements, other research and development materials and equipment, and the fair market value of cross-licenses. 

The speakers highlighted an important distinction in how UC and Stanford prefer to handle patent prosecution in exclusive licenses.  The UC position is that the university controls all patent prosecution, whereas the preferred Stanford position is that the licensee controls all patent prosecution.  In both cases, the universities require that the exclusive licensee pays for the costs; however, UC prefers that the licensee reimburse UC for the patent prosecution costs, whereas Stanford prefers that the licensee pay the costs directly.

How do the universities deal with patent enforcement?

Ku indicated that Stanford’s default position is that Stanford has the right to enforce the patents, and that the licensee can step in if Stanford declines to enforce the patents.  Ku further stated that if the licensee enforces the patents, any damages recovered should cover costs first and then the balance should be treated as net sales/sublicense income. 

In contrast, Wolinsky stated that UC’s default position is the same as Stanford’s position, except that any damages recovered should go to the party bringing suit. 

Both Stanford and UC require university consent prior to any settlement, and provide the right to name the university as a party for standing.

How are Stanford and UC dealing with the recent MedImmune v. Genentech decision?

UC is taking the most unforgiving position on this issue.  According to Wolinsky, the position is that UC is drafting language into the license to state that if a licensee disputes the validity of a patent, the patent terminates.

In contrast, the Stanford position is a little more tolerant: Stanford is drafting language into the license to state that if a licensee disputes the validity of a patent, the licensee has to pay all costs.

Regarding other issues in the news, both Ku and Wolinsky indicated that the universities were very concerned about the prospect of patent reform, particularly with respect to the proposed changes to the "First to File" Rule.  Ku and Wolinsky also stated that both systems were now adding export control language to their NDAs as well as licenses.  Finally, with respect to sponsored research, Ku indicated that the Stanford policy is that the university is declining to set a royalty rate for inventions arising out of sponsored research, whereas Wolinsky indicated that UC continues to agree to a royalty rate range.

All in all, Ku and Wolinsky gave a very informative presentation on current licensing policies at their respective institutions.  After attending this presentation, however, I now find myself wanting to hear more from other universities on their current policies and procedures on licensing.  So, I am formally issuing an invitation into the blogosphere to any other universities who would like to share information to prospective licensees on their current licensing policies, procedures, and negotiating strategies: please share with us any insights on licensing at your schools, and this blog will gladly provide you a platform to publish that information to the biotech and licensing community.   I welcome your commentary. 


Category: Biotech Deals, Biotech Patent Licensing, Practical Tips  |  Comments Off on Stanford, UC Representatives Offer Insights on Licensing with their Universities

Another Look at MedImmune v. Genentech

Written by on Wednesday, May 30th, 2007

The Medimmune v. Genentech case has received extensive media coverage since the Supreme Court decision earlier this year, but if you still have questions about the case and its anticipated impact, you should check out the recap published on IP Frontline by attorney Dennis Fernandez and college student Brian Bensch.

In their article "The Impact of MedImmune v. Genentech," the authors describe the potential implications of MedImmune as follows:

The major implication of MedImmune is that potential and current licensees will find it incredibly easier to file a declaratory judgment action. . . . After MedImmune, licensees will be able to recklessly challenge contracts knowing that the worst possible consequence is that the contract is upheld. . . .

[T]he implications of MedImmune are already taking shape. Since the MedImmune ruling only four months ago, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has begun to clarify the impact of MedImmune by dropping the "reasonable apprehension" clause of its subject matter jurisdiction test in its decision in SanDisk Corporation v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. . . .

 [I]n its decision on March 26 of this year, the CAFC established a new test that "holds that "where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without license," the party may bring a declaratory judgment action."

In the end, the authors conclude that the impact of the ruling will be as follows:

[T]he Supreme Court’s MedImmune decision weakened the stability of both future and current licensing agreements. While the federal circuit’s precedent had been rather unambiguous, the Supreme Court accepted the circularly reasoning and exaggerated risk claimed by MedImmune and allowed it to file for declaratory judgment relief against its licensor without first ending their licensing agreement. The decision gives a blank check to licensees to challenge their licensor on patent invalidity charges if they feel they have any chance at success.

As a licensing attorney looking at this case and the subsequent San Disk ruling, I can’t help but wonder if the impact of these decisions is really going to be as severe as legal commentators are predicting.  While certainly this line of cases enables licensees to challenge licenses more easily, I question whether this will really happen with the kind of frequency you might expect from the commentary.  Is it possible that they are looking at these cases from litigator’s perspective rather than considering the business realities that would often caution against souring an otherwise cordial business relationship?

The vast majority of licensing negotiations are not done at the end of a big stick, and that there are generally sound business reasons to maintain a good relationship with the other side of the negotiating table.  While it is true that these cases make it easier for licensees to challenge a licensing relationship, I question whether it will make good business sense for licensees to do so as frequently as it has been suggested they will do.  Will licensors really want to do deals with licensees who have challenged other licensing agreements with third parties?  Will licensors really want to develop relationships with licensees who have challenged  other licensing arrangements with prior licensors? 

In the end, I suspect that the application of these cases will depend largely on the realities of the business world.  I find it hard to believe that regularly challenging license agreements will ultimately prove to be a good business strategy as the dust settles on these decisions.  I anticipate that in the end declaratory judgments will be used a little more judiciously to challenge relationships that have already soured, in much the same way that litigation and the threat of litigation have been used prior to the MedImmune ruling.  When a relationship can be managed outside of the courtroom, I continue to believe that, despite the hype to the contrary, the average licensee is going to stick with negotiation and stay away from the courts. 

 

 

 

 

 


Category: Biotech Disputes, Biotech Legal Disputes, Biotech Patent Licensing  |  Comments Off on Another Look at MedImmune v. Genentech

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